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In Asian-Pacific developing countries, the prevalence of food insecurity has diminished 
dramatically in the past generation.  Despite this, many millions continue to suffer from 
persistent or periodic food insecurity.  The causes of food insecurity are both structural and 
market-related, including influences of public policy on market operations.  The most vulnerable 
populations are those that simultaneously experience both these forms of insecurity.  The places 
they inhabit tend to have poor-quality land, are exposed to climatic and other environmental 
risks, or both.  These same populations either have relatively weak links with the non-food 
economy, in which higher wages and better income-earning opportunities make food self-
sufficiency less important, or are prevented from accessing opportunities in the non-food 
economy because of poor or misguided policies. 
                                                 
1 Paper prepared for UN ESCAP conference on Food Insecurity in Asia and the Pacific, 
Bangkok, January 8-9 2009.  Address for correspondence: southgate.1@osu.edu  
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1.  Introduction 
Food insecurity and poverty are intertwined and the alleviation of both is strongly correlated with 
overall economic progress.  Nowhere are these linkages more apparent than in Asia and the 
Pacific.  Other than during the financial crisis of 1997 and 1998, every large economy in the 
region and practically all the smaller ones have registered positive (and in many cases high) rates 
of expansion for more than two decades, the most notable exceptions being Myanmar, North 
Korea, and the Philippines (Southgate, Graham, and Tweeten 2007, pp. 229-231).  Thanks to this 
expansion, tens of millions of people no longer suffer from severe economic deprivation.  In East 
Asia and the Pacific, for example, the incidence of extreme poverty, defined using the World 
Bank’s $1.25/day standard, fell from 79 percent of population in 1981 to 18 percent in 2005 
(Chen and Ravallion 2008). 
Major strides have been made toward food security as well.  The FAO estimates that in 
1969-71, 762 million people in Asia were undernourished.  Despite population growth, that 
estimate fell to 722 million in 1979-81, 582 million in 1990-92, and 535 million in 1995-97.  
Estimates for 2003-05 indicate a slight rise, to 542 million.  The countries experiencing increases 
between 1995-97 and 2003-05 were India (31 million), Indonesia (10 million), Pakistan (9 
million), and the Philippines (0.5 million).  All other Asian countries show a decline or no 
change (FAO 2008b). 
To put the aggregate achievement into proper perspective, consider that, as recently as 
four decades ago, no part of the developing world had a higher prevalence of food insecurity 
than Asia and the Pacific.  Indeed, the threat of famine in the region where more than half the 
human race lives was severe enough to provoke widespread despondency during the 1960s and 
1970s.  Environmentalist Paul Ehrlich, for one, concluded that many parts of Asia and the Pacific 
were beyond hope, and argued that continued food aid to countries such as India was futile 
(1968, pp. 141-149). 
But notwithstanding the correlation between economic growth and reductions in 
aggregate poverty and hunger, progress toward food security has been far from uniform.  As the 
above figures reveal, three of Asia’s largest and poorest nations – India, Indonesia, and Pakistan 
– recorded increases in undernourishment between the late 1990s and the early 2000s and these 
increases exceeded the declines registered elsewhere in the region, such as in Bangladesh, China, 
and Vietnam.  Even in countries that have experienced rapid economic expansion and noticeable 
declines in the overall prevalence of food insecurity, subpopulations that are chronically or 
periodically under-nourished still exist – precisely because these subpopulations have conditions 
or characteristics which prevent them from benefiting as the aggregate economy expands.  
Circumstances that combine to produce food insecurity include poor land quality, exposure to 
environmental risks, and isolation from labor and other markets.  Gender inequality can also 
interfere with adequate nourishment, not only for women but also for their children. 
This paper’s assessment of food insecurity in Asia and the Pacific is predicated on a 
definition of the problem that is consistent with the FAO’s declaration that the goal of ending 
hunger around the world will have been achieved “when all people at all times have physical, 
social, and economic access [emphasis added] to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO 2002, p. 49).  In 
addition, our diagnosis of the causes of food insecurity draws on a framework offered by Nobel-
laureate economist A.K. Sen.  In his 1981 book, Poverty and Famines, Sen proposes two broad  
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categories of the causes of food insecurity, one being structural and the other market-related.  
The first sort of insecurity has to do with one’s incapacity to produce enough sustenance on 
one’s own.  In contrast, market-related insecurity arises when a household, region, or country 
that may have structural food insecurity is also unable to exchange its own output or assets 
(including labor) for sufficient food.
2 
As recent trends in Asia and the Pacific demonstrate, various processes – including 
population growth, the development of new agricultural technologies, environmental 
degradation, etc. – exacerbate or alleviate structural food insecurity.  By the same token, a wide 
array of policies and institutions influence the terms of market-based exchange between people 
at risk of going hungry and other economic actors.  As these policies and institutions change, 
market-related food insecurity is affected. 
 
2.  Structural food insecurity 
Structural food insecurity results because land, labor, and complementary productive resources at 
the disposal of a household, region, or nation are not adequate to produce all the food it needs.  
One possible reason might be land scarcity.  But structural insecurity can also be a consequence 
of technological backwardness, the unavailability of non-land inputs, or climatic adversity, such 
as drought. 
By definition, structural food insecurity exists for urban communities and even for entire 
nations (e.g., Singapore) which are very short of arable land.  But whether or not the inhabitants 
of these settings actually experience hunger hinges on market- and policy-related factors.  
Indeed, the incidence of food insecurity is trivial if the non-agricultural output of urban areas can 
be exchanged for adequate amounts of food. 
Structural food insecurity can also be a problem for rural populations located at the arable 
margin, such as drought-prone areas in western China and northeastern Thailand; high-altitude 
settings in the Himalayas and in the mountains that divide China from its southern neighbors; 
and coastal regions that are highly susceptible to typhoons, for example in the central Philippines 
and central Vietnam.  For deficit areas such as these, structural food insecurity may be measured 
in terms of the number of months a population can feed itself from one year’s output of rice.  
This statistic is often reported, from the household level all the way up to the national level, since 
rice is the staple cereal for most Asians and on average accounts for over 40 percent of daily 
caloric intake (Pandey 2008). 
Structural deficits in the capacity for food production can change, sometimes quite 
dramatically in just a few years.  Demographic expansion, for example, can increase population 
density in the countryside, thereby increasing the pressure on agricultural land.  In contrast, 
improved human nutrition and health increase a population’s capacity for productive work.  
Also, the introduction of new agricultural technologies, such as high-yielding varieties of grain, 
alters the productivity of land – as do irrigation, drainage, and other improvements in physical 
infrastructure, which almost always are paid for by government.  Thanks to a steady flow of 
agricultural innovations from the international agricultural research system, including the 
                                                 
2 Sen (1981) refers to these as “direct entitlement failure” and “exchange entitlement failure,” respectively.  
    3 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), yield growth was sustained for about two decades 
beginning in the middle 1960s.  Just as Ehrlich and others were declaring that Asia’s fate was 
sealed, this Green Revolution was making possible major changes in farming practices 
throughout the region. 
In the rest of this section, we survey the broad processes that have added to or diminished 
structural food insecurity in Asia and the Pacific.  These include population and demand growth, 
the intensification of agricultural production and introduction of new technologies, and more 
recent stresses associated with environmental degradation. 
 
A.  Population and demand growth 
Current problems of food security in Asia must be viewed in the context of population growth 
and economic expansion, both of which have direct impacts on food demand.  Demographic 
increase in the region is decelerating, though still substantial.  By world standards, economic 
growth has remained high in the best-performing regional economies and, with a few exceptions, 
has accelerated in those that embarked later on globalization and economic liberalization. 
In 1950, Asia’s population was 1.34 billion, equal to 54 percent of the global total.  
During the next quarter century, human numbers in the continent went up by 2.1 percent per 
annum, reaching 2.26 billion in 1975.  During the next 25 years, annual growth was slower, 
averaging 1.7 percent.  But there was less demographic expansion in Europe, North America, 
and other affluent regions, so Asia’s share of the global population was larger at the turn of the 
twenty-first century than it had been 50 years earlier:  3.46 billion out of 6.06 billion, or 57 
percent (UNDP 2002, pp. 162-165). 
In Asia as in other parts of the world, dramatic declines in human fertility have been the 
primary reason for decelerating population growth.  In China, for example, the total fertility rate 
(TFR) fell from 2.5 births per woman in 1980 to 1.8 births in 2006 (World Bank 2008b).  If the 
latter rate, which is lower than the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman, is sustained for a 
few more decades, China’s population will contract. 
By no means is China the only Asian and Pacific nation to experience a reduction in 
human fertility.  To the contrary, comparable declines have occurred throughout the region, 
falling to or below the replacement level in nearly every country where per-capita income equals 
or exceeds $3,000,
3 with a correction for purchasing power parity (PPP), and registering sizable 
reductions elsewhere.
4  Human fertility exceeds the replacement level in the world’s second most 
populous nation, though not by much.  After being equal to 5.0 births per woman in 1980, 
India’s TFR has now fallen to 2.5 (World Bank 2008b). 
Natural increase (defined as the difference between birth and death rates) will continue in 
Asia for a few more decades, although the specter of unbridled growth in human numbers has 
                                                 
3 Examples include Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, with TFRs in 2006 of 2.2, 1.9, and 1.8 births per woman, 
respectively (World Bank, 2008b). 
4 Between 1980 and 2006, the number of births per woman fell from 7.0 to 3.9 in Pakistan and from 6.1 to 2.9 in 
Bangladesh (World Bank, 2008b).  
    4 
receded in the world’s largest and most populous continent.  In various countries, including but 
not limited to China, growth in food demand is now driven less by demographic expansion than 
by the dietary diversification and improvement resulting from better standards of living. 
Notwithstanding intra-regional variations and the impacts of periodic slow-downs, the 
general trend in Asia is one of increased household earnings.  This affects what people eat in 
multiple ways.  Whereas penurious households use most of their available resources to satisfy 
caloric requirements – usually by consuming the cheapest available carbohydrates – diets quickly 
diversify as poverty is left behind.  More fruits and vegetables are eaten, for example, and 
protein intake increases.  The most important consequence of improved living standards in Asia 
and the Pacific, not to mention other developing regions, is increased consumption of meat, dairy 
goods, and eggs.  This in turn causes additional corn and other grains to be fed to cattle, poultry, 
and other livestock. 
Table 1 shows current trends in human numbers and GDP per capita in various countries 
and, for some countries, income elasticities of food demand (i.e., relative growth in demand 
resulting from a 1 percent increase in earnings).  This information can be combined to obtain 
simple estimates of annual demand growth, which are provided for some countries in the final 
column of Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Of the 14 nations listed in Table 1, Nepal is the only one where demand growth is mainly 
the result of demographic expansion.  Elsewhere, including a number of countries where annual 
population growth exceeds 1.5%, growth in per-capita consumption (calculated by multiplying 
growth in average incomes by income elasticity) exceeds the rate of population increase.  
Although elasticity estimates are not provided for the two largest nations, improved living 
standards are undoubtedly the main driver of demand growth in China and India. 
 
B.  Agricultural intensification 
As reported in Chapter 4, aggregate food insecurity in Asia has abated in recent decades.  This 
has happened even though, as already indicated, human numbers and food consumption have 
been going up at a rapid clip.  Moreover, increases in population and food demand, which have 
been outstripped by growth in the supply of edible goods, have not unleashed an unmeasured 
expansion of agricultural land use.  The main reason for this outcome is the agricultural 
development taking place in Asia since the middle 1960s. 
Recent changes in farming have been influenced in various ways by demographic and 
geographic realities.  Since agriculture and civilization have such a long history in China, India, 
Java (Indonesia’s most populous island), and other settings, population density is elevated in 
many parts of the continent.  In addition, opportunities to increase crop and livestock production 
by expanding the geographic domain of agriculture are limited.  Even where such opportunities 
exist (on some Indonesian islands for example) agricultural extensification (i.e., the expansion of 
cultivated area) has adverse environmental impacts, such as biodiversity losses that occur as 
farmers colonize tropical forests and other species-rich habitats.  Between these environmental  
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impacts and the direct expenses farmers must incur to clear away trees and other vegetation, no 
major increase in agricultural land use is anticipated in the region (Fischer and Heilig 1997). 
Elevated population densities have induced the kind of agricultural intensification 
characteristic of settings where land is in short supply.  According to the hypothesis of induced 
innovation, agricultural development is accomplished by raising the productivity of either labor 
or land, whichever is scarcer.  In places, such as Australia, where labor is scarce relative to land, 
mechanization (i.e., the substitution of implements and machinery for labor) is a basic feature of 
agricultural development.  In contrast, a combination of land scarcity and labor abundance, 
which has been the fundamental reality in Japan since before the twentieth century and is the 
norm today in tropical Asia, encourages the adoption of measures to raise land productivity, 
including fertilization, irrigation, and biological improvement (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). 
The Green Revolution, which got under way in many parts of Asia in the middle 1960s, 
is a classic illustration of an increase in land productivity induced by the relative scarcity of 
natural resource inputs to agriculture.  This advance was made possible by research and testing 
carried out over many years with support provided initially by the Rockefeller and Ford 
Foundations and later by donor agencies such as the World Bank and U.S. Agency for 
International Development.  Thanks to this research and testing, new varieties of rice and wheat 
were developed which produced more grain than traditional strains when fertilizer and irrigation 
water were applied to farm fields (Dalrymple 1985). 
As indicated in Figure 1, improved varieties of rice and wheat were adopted very quickly 
in South and Southeast Asia.  Something else to observe about the Green Revolution is that small 
farmers in favorable production environments adopted new technology about as readily as other 
producers (David and Otsuka 1993).  In addition, the new technologies greatly increased labor 
requirements per hectare and per year (due to multiple cropping).  As a result, more employment 
was created for the poorest of the rural poor, who generally lack land and earn their primary 
incomes through employment on others’ farms.  The greatest impact of the Green Revolution 
was to raise cereal yields – not just in Asia but, as is shown in Figure 2, throughout the world.  
With yields and output going up, food prices fell, including for people who otherwise would 
have starved (Dalrymple 1985; Southgate, Graham, and Tweeten 2007, pp. 110-111). 
As reported in Table 2, fertilizer use and irrigation have continued to increase since the 
Green Revolution.
5  So have agricultural yields.  There are just a few nations where crop 
production per hectare did not rise by at least 50 percent between 1980 and 2000.  Among these 
exceptions are Malaysia and Sri Lanka, where yields already had reached high levels three 
decades ago.  Another is Thailand, which is the world’s leading exporter of rice and where 
fertilizer applications and irrigation are not high relative to regional norms.  During the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, China, India, and Vietnam registered yield gains of 60 percent, 
81 percent, and 114 percent, respectively.  
                                                 
5 Application rates in China had climbed already to 149 kg/ha in 1980 and since then have risen above 250 kg/ha, 
which exceeds the rate in most affluent nations.  Fertilizer use in India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, and a number 
of other countries also rose from 65 kg/ha or less to 100 kg/ha or more.  Meanwhile, the irrigated share of cropland 
was increasing in many places.  This share declined in China and Indonesia, not because fewer hectares were being 
irrigated but instead due to the geographic expansion of rain-fed agriculture.  Almost everywhere else, a larger 
percentage of arable land is irrigated today than was the case in 1980 – even in Pakistan, where little more than one 
in every four hectares planted to crops was rain-fed three decades ago.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
Thanks mainly to yield growth, agricultural output increased faster than human numbers 
during the last three decades of the twentieth century (Table 3).  Exceptions to this trend include 
roots and tubers in China and neighboring nations and corn, millet, and pulses in India and the 
surrounding region.  In addition, fruit and vegetable production went up at a very fast rate, in 
response to the dietary diversification resulting from improved living standards, although more 
because additional land was planted to these commodities than because of yield growth.  
However, output of rice, which is the staple crop throughout Asia, went up faster than population 
mainly because of yield increases, during as well as since the Green Revolution.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Land productivity gains during the Green Revolution were instrumental in reducing 
structural food insecurity in Asia. Will these gains continue into the future?  Though no 
prediction can be made with certainty, future yield growth faces two easily identifiable threats.  
One of these is environmental damage, including land degradation.  The other is the diminishing 
rate of technological innovation, resulting in part from reduced budgets for agricultural research 
and development. 
Each of these threats is examined in the sub-sections that follow. 
 
C.  Environmental degradation 
Addressing the structural causes of food insecurity through supply-side interventions – such as 
infrastructure improvements, irrigation development, and technological innovation – is necessary 
for eliminating food insecurity, but not sufficient.  This is so partly because the productivity of 
agriculture’s underlying resource, which is land, does not remain constant under conditions of 
intensive production.  Furthermore, as emphasized in the next section of this paper, economic 
conditions must also be right for production and productivity to grow, in response to additions to 
productive capacity. 
Land degradation is analogous to technical deterioration.  In other words, it is the 
converse of land-saving innovations associated with the Green Revolution.  Continuous and 
intensive cultivation, especially of a single crop, without compensating investments in the 
maintenance of soil fertility and health can reduce cereal yields, even in well-managed settings 
such as experimental plots at the International Rice Research Institute (Cassman and Pingali 
1995).  Salination, soil compaction, lower water tables, and other broad environmental changes 
are other important agriculturally-related sources of productivity loss in some areas.  Thus land 
degradation, and specifically the loss of soil productivity due to agricultural intensification, has 
offset some of the structural food security gains of the Green Revolution. 
This form of environmental degradation is mainly local in nature.  The most influential 
assessment of global land degradation suggests that 5 to 6 million hectares of farmland  
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(equivalent to 0.3 to 0.5 percent of the world’s arable area) are lost permanently each year due to 
human-induced land degradation (Oldeman et al. 1991).  Soil quality on three quarters of the 
world’s agricultural land has been fairly stable during the last 50 years, but on the remaining 
share degradation is widespread and has accelerated.  Productivity has declined substantially on 
about 16 percent of agricultural land in developing countries – primarily at the margins of 
cultivation, especially desert fringes and in steeply-sloped and high-altitude settings (Scherr 
1999).  Tropical Asia has been less affected than other low-latitude settings, however (Coxhead 
and Øygard 2008). 
How does environmental degradation interact with food insecurity?  At the household 
level, poverty and environmental degradation go hand in hand.  The food-insecure discount the 
future very heavily, and lack the resources necessary to design and apply sustainable practices.  
In Asia, extreme poverty (and thus food insecurity) is most prevalent among remote rural 
populations, frequently ethnic minorities that lack resources as well as opportunities to 
participate in the wider economy.  These populations are thus more dependent on their own 
production, but at the same time must depend on mountainous soils that are low in nutrients and 
that are easily leached and eroded.  To summarize, land degradation, vulnerability to crop losses, 
and food insecurity are all part of a web of chronic marginalization and poverty. 
Agricultural intensification itself has had mixed environmental impacts during and since 
the Green Revolution.  Thanks to higher yields in established lowland settings, encroachment on 
forests and other natural ecosystems by food cultivators has been largely arrested.  Indeed, it is 
no exaggeration that tropical forests in most of Asia (not to mention many other parts of the 
world) would now be spoken of in the past tense had the Green Revolution not made possible the 
cultivation of more crops per year of higher-yielding cereal varieties on existing land.  [Of 
course, this has not forestalled continued deforestation due to unsustainable timber extraction 
and the production of oil palm and other industrial crops (see, e.g., Curran et al., 2004).]  But 
balanced against the undeniable benefit of slower deforestation are some of the negative 
consequences of raising crop yields by relying more on chemical inputs and irrigation.  The 
limits of that strategy for agricultural intensification are indicated by a study from the 
Philippines, which found that the value of additional rice harvested due to the application of 
pesticides may be exceeded by the costs of poor health suffered by farmers and others exposed to 
that input (Pingali et al. 1995). 
Agricultural intensification also has had far-reaching consequences for hydrologic 
resources.  Throughout the developing world, crop and livestock production accounts for all but 
a small portion of overall water use.  In East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific, agriculture’s 
share is 81 percent, compared to 14 percent for industry and just 5 percent for households.  The 
corresponding shares in South Asia are 94, 3, and 4 percent, respectively (World Bank 2008b).   
There is no doubt that agricultural pressure on hydrologic resources is excessive.  One 
reason for this is market failure, which occurs if growers do not fully internalize the 
environmental costs of crop and livestock production.  For example, chemical inputs that are not 
absorbed by crops or fixed in soil are apt to find their way into rivers, lakes, and the sea.  The 
economic consequences of pollution caused by this run-off, which might include fish kills and 
increased expenditures on water treatment, are not taken into account by farmers.  As a result, 
they tend to apply too many chemicals and use too much water.  These problems have reached 
extreme proportions in Central Asia, in part because water mismanagement in one country 
imposes costs on its downstream neighbors.  
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Market failure is not the only reason for the waste and mismanagement of hydrologic 
resources in the agricultural sector.  In many places, it is not even the leading explanation.  To 
promote agricultural intensification, a number of governments subsidize irrigation – and not by a 
little, but by a lot.  All too often, the payments made by farmers fall short of the recurring costs 
of operating and maintaining canals, pumping stations, and other infrastructure needed to 
channel water to their fields.  When this occurs, irrigators make no contribution whatsoever to 
the amortization of capital expenses, which are considerable.  With prices thus distorted, farmers 
have little reason to adopt conservation measures.  Indeed, water use by farmers has become so 
excessive that additional irrigation development is now constrained by the resulting conflicts 
over resources between agriculture, on the one hand, and industry and households, on the other 
(Rosegrant, Cai, and Cline 2002).  Irrigation runoff has its own environmental effects as well, 
contributing in some areas to increased salination. 
While abundant water (where available) has helped to achieve and maintain gains from 
the Green Revolution, the subsidies implicit in providing water to farmers at prices that are far 
below costs are classic examples of policy failure.
6  But these are not the only examples in Asian 
agriculture.  As in a number of countries, the Indian government provides fertilizer to farmers at 
below-market prices.  Furthermore, nitrogen (from urea and other sources) is particularly cheap 
relative to phosphorus and potassium.  In response, Indian farmers apply too much of the first 
nutrient and too little of the second and third.  Accordingly, crop growth is held back by the 
limited availability of phosphorus and potassium and the returns to nitrogen applications are 
diminished.  It is estimated that a switch to more balanced fertilization, as agronomists 
recommend and as would occur if price distortions were eliminated, would cause annual 
production of rice and wheat to increase by 160 million tons and 25 million tons, respectively 
(Roy 2003, cited by Southgate, Graham, and Tweeten 2007, p. 111). 
Not all environmental risk is related to the actions of farmers.  In addition to on-site and 
localized degradation of land and water resources, tropical Asia could face increasingly severe 
environmental risks as the result of global climate change.  Agriculture could be threatened in 
various ways.  In Asia and the Pacific, one important manifestation of climate change may be the 
increased frequency of storms, which affect low-lying coastal and deltaic areas.  The resulting 
impacts were exemplified in May 2008, when Cyclone Nargis and the storm surge it created 
caused salt water to inundate a large part of the Irrawaddy Delta, which is Myanmar’s main rice-
growing region.  There were substantial losses of both production capacity during the 2008 
growing season and stored rice from previous harvests, which increased vulnerability to hunger 
nationwide.  Furthermore production capacity may be diminished in the future because of 
damage to infrastructure and the loss of farm machinery, draught animals, and resources for the 
purchase of seeds and fertilizer (FAO 2008a). 
A second trend related to climate is rising sea levels, which are predicted to threaten 
some of the most productive (or potentially productive) food-growing areas in Asia and the 
Pacific.  A rise of 50 cm, which according to some projections could occur by 2070, would 
inundate more than half a million square kilometers of coastal land in the region, mainly in the 
                                                 
6 Efforts to address this policy failure, mainly through water-pricing structures, have had remarkably little success.  
One reason is that farmers’ demand for water appears to be singularly unresponsive to price.  Also, transaction costs 
are high and the barriers to water “smuggling” are relatively low (Molle and Berkoff, 2007).  
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Gangetic delta system spanning India and Bangladesh, the Irrawaddy Delta in Myanmar, 
Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, and the Pearl River Delta in southern China.  Other possible 
consequences of global warming include increased rainfall variability and yield reductions 
caused by heat stress. 
 
D.  Lagging research and development 
There is no doubt that a key cause of improved food security over the past generation in Asia and 
the Pacific was the provision of a steady flow of productivity-enhancing agricultural innovations, 
starting, but by no means ending, with the Green Revolution.  At a global summit convened in 
Rome in June 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon paid special attention to the need for 
continued support for agricultural research and development, and his assessment that current 
funding is deficient is consistent with all available evidence. 
Public-sector budgets appear to have peaked during the 1980s (Pardey and Beintema 
2001).  During the last decade of the twentieth century, government funding held steady in 
affluent nations.  Meanwhile, budgets fell in the developing world, presumably because 
government authorities regarded technological progress in agriculture as a low priority so long as 
food was cheap.  Support for the activities of the international agricultural research centers also 
diminished.  For example, the International Rice Research Institute, which was the source of 
most of the breakthrough gains of the Green Revolution in tropical Asia during the 1960s and 
1970s, saw its budget fall in inflation-adjusted terms from $US55m per year in 1992 to under 
$US30m in 2004 (Otsuka 2005).  
In the United States and a few other affluent nations where intellectual property rights are 
generally respected, private agribusiness firms spend large sums on agricultural biotechnology.  
This private investment substitutes to an extent for expenditures by the public sector benefiting 
crop and livestock production.  The governments of three developing nations – Brazil, China, 
and India – also provide substantial support for research and development, including 
biotechnology.  But elsewhere in the developing world, this support has dwindled to very low 
levels, as Pardey and Beintema (2001) emphasize. 
Reflecting the consensus among specialists in agricultural development, Secretary 
General Ban has called for a renewed commitment to research and development.  The “overall 
price tag for national governments and international donors,” he states, “could exceed $15 to 20 
billion annually, over a number of years” (Ban 2008).
7 
 
3.  Market-related food insecurity 
No matter what the aggregate rate of technical innovation is, and despite intensive use and 
conservation of land and other scarce resources, there will always be countries – and certainly 
subpopulations within countries – that are incapable of feeding themselves from their own 
                                                 
7 Future improvements in agricultural technology depend on factors other than financial support.  For example, 
conservation of biodiversity, which is particularly threatened in insular environments (e.g., remote islands in the 
Pacific Ocean), is also needed.  
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production.  More than that, many of these countries and subpopulations should not be expected 
to do so.  Having made this observation, we turn to the second set of causes of food insecurity, 
broadly defined as being market-related. 
The concept of market-related food insecurity captures factors governing the terms of 
trade (i.e., the relative prices at which exchange takes place) between food-deficit households, 
areas, or economies, on the one hand, and the outside world, on the other.  The term “market” is 
used here in the broadest possible sense.  Aside from the operation of markets as conventionally 
understood, it includes the failures of markets, such as when insurance cannot be used to cover 
the risks resulting from lost crops or associated with price variability.  Also included are explicit 
governmental actions that influence or even supplant market operations through the deployment 
of instruments such as trade and pricing policies and the involvement of state instrumentalities in 
food production, storage, and distribution.  Market-related food insecurity is complementary to 
structural insecurity in the sense that the former is a challenge for households, regions, or 
countries that cannot achieve structural food security, and are thus bound to be net food buyers. 
  The concept of market-related food insecurity is best understood, and the main issues 
outlined, by considering a hypothetical poor household that suffers from chronic structural food 
insecurity.  To simplify, suppose that labor is the only resource that the household, which is a net 
buyer of food, can supply to the market in exchange for food and other goods.  The terms of 
trade between this household and the market can be described by the ratio wL/CPI, where w is 
the wage earned per hour of effective labor (L) supplied by the household and CPI is the relevant 
consumer price index.
8  CPI serves as a deflator for converting nominal (e.g., dollar) earnings 
into a measure of purchasing power.  Thus, the same ratio, wL/CPI, defines real income (Y) for 
most households, although Y for households receiving transfers (T) equals (wL+ T)/CPI. 
Key influences on purchasing power having been identified, we now consider dynamics 
of the market-related food insecurity.  An arithmetic conversion of the expression for Y provides 
its equivalent in percentage growth form, in which the symbol, ∆, refers to the year-on-year 
growth rate of a variable (so, for example, ∆Y represents the growth rate of Y) and S is the initial 
portion of total nominal income derived from labor earnings: 
     ∆Y = S(∆w + ∆L) + (1 – S)∆T – ∆CPI.   
For the individual household, purchasing power (and by extension food security) is 
increased by higher wages offered in labor markets, by an increase in its effective labor 
endowment, and by higher transfers.  Conversely, purchasing power is diminished by increases 
in the prices of food and other purchased goods.  Labor and wage changes have a larger effect on 
purchasing power when the initial share of labor earnings is large (i.e., the value of S is close to 
1).  Conversely, when labor force participation is not a sizable contributor to household income 
(i.e., S is close to zero), changes in transfer income gain in relative importance. 
                                                 
8 The weights attached to individual goods in this index are shares of the household’s budget allocation.  Thus, for 
example, if the 60 percent of the household’s expenditure is on food and the remainder on non-food, then a 10 
percent rise in the price of food, with other prices unchanged, would increase CPI (and thus reduce the household’s 
real income) by 0.6*10% = 6%.  
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As indicated in the four sub-sections that follow, government policies may affect ∆CPI 
directly, for example through food subsidies or barriers to agricultural trade policies.  Also, 
policies may affect ∆w directly, perhaps through labor-market interventions.  However, in 
developing countries the effects on w tend to be indirect, such as when foreign direct investment 
inflows raise labor productivity and bid up wages.  Other interventions may augment the 
effective labor endowment, such as through provision of health and education services.  Of 
course, ∆T is subject both to government policy influence and the actions of others (e.g., foreign 
aid programs) that target the welfare of the poor.  Thus, in the context of a more real-world 
version of our simple framework, it is clear that economic growth and development policies 
exert multifarious influences on the capacity of households, communities, and nations that do not 
supply themselves with adequate food. 
 
A.  Markets and food insecurity 
Even in Asia’s food-exporting countries, households that are net sellers of food comprise a 
surprisingly small fraction of the population.  Vietnam, for example, is the world’s second 
largest exporter of rice.  Yet even in the country’s “rice basket” areas, less than half the 
population sells more rice than it buys:  47 percent in the Mekong Delta and 45 percent in the 
Red River Delta (Glewwe and Linh 2008). 
For those who do not produce enough food to supply their own needs, escape from food 
insecurity depends on the terms of trade at which they exchange their production (e.g., non-food 
agricultural output) or their assets (e.g., labor) for food and other basic wants.  If these terms of 
trade are unfavorable, or move in an unfavorable direction, individuals or communities can exist 
in, or fall into, a state of food insecurity.  Conversely, an improvement in the terms of trade, for 
example due to falling food prices or rising wages, can be a source of improved food security 
among the poor.  
The physical conditions of agriculture, including infrastructure and technology, typically 
change quite slowly.  Moreover, many food-insecure populations confront production conditions 
so adverse that technological and infrastructural improvements may still leave them unable to 
reach self-sufficiency.  Under these circumstances, markets (and the institutions and policies that 
influence their operation) play a major role in determining who is food-insecure and for how 
long.  Importantly, markets transmit the effects of macroeconomic growth (or of failure to grow) 
to food deficit areas and communities.  The problem of food insecurity, like that of poverty, is 
frequently traceable to macroeconomic conditions and market failures rather than to chronic 
structural deficits.  Sen noted that the Bengal famine of the early 1940s was one of flawed 
distribution, not underproduction.  So did Ravallion (1987) in his seminal study of the 1974 
famine in Bangladesh.  During China’s last famine, during the Great Leap Forward of 1958 to 
1961, 20 million people or more died because of starvation or hunger-related causes while the 
country continued to sell grain on the international market (Short 1999, pp. 486-505). 
 
B.  Wages, labor, and migration 
In the long run, the security of food supplies at every level of the economy can only be assured 
by guaranteeing that the purchasing power of the poor is adequate to cover food costs, and that 
markets and market-related infrastructure are in place to meet their demands in a timely fashion.   
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As labor is typically the most important economic asset of the poor, it is not surprising that labor 
markets are of singular importance as factors determining the escape from poverty. 
In some ways, economic development can raise the productivity of rural labor in situ.  
The Green Revolution was an example of technological innovations with complementary 
investment (irrigation, etc.) that raised the productivity of on-farm labor.  But more and more, 
growth occurring outside of agriculture is of the greatest importance for the welfare of the poor.  
Modern economic growth in many parts of Asia is increasingly characterized by urban and 
industrial job expansion.  This induces internal migration, especially the movement of labor out 
of regions that tend to be structurally deficient or are routinely vulnerable to supply shocks.  
Myanmar, northeastern Thailand, central and western China, northern and north-central Vietnam, 
the central Philippines, and rural Java and large parts of Sumatra in Indonesia are all 
experiencing out-migration, primarily by workers who are rural, poor, landless, or land-deprived. 
Migrants’ principal motives may be negative (distress; displacement) or positive 
(opportunity).  But since each of these motives results in the same action, it is very difficult to 
distinguish between the two.  Often the best an analyst can do is to make inferences by 
examining outcomes after the fact – in particular, by assessing whether migrants are better off 
after the move than before.  One proximate indicator is the existence and growth of employment 
opportunities in the destination.  High or rising underemployment and unemployment, falling 
earnings, widespread labor exploitation, and other obvious signs of hardship among migrants are 
clear evidence of distress-related motives, and poverty and food insecurity in urban slums are no 
less severe for being in an urban setting. 
For example, the slums and squatter communities that pervaded Manila in the 1980s and 
1990s reflected both persistent anti-agriculture policies and sluggish growth for the economy as a 
whole, resulting in widespread economic and social dislocation and insecurity.  In Asia’s most 
deprived populations, especially in Myanmar and North Korea, cross-border migration is a 
gamble of utter desperation by those for whom staying home almost certainly means severe 
under-nutrition.  About 1.5 million Burmese workers in Thailand have crossed the border to 
work in jobs that are “dirty, difficult, and dangerous” (not to mention degrading) and that pay 
only two-thirds of the wages offered to Thai workers (Kulkolkarn et al. 2007).  In Vietnam, 
some of the migration in recent years has been distress-driven.  This is especially true of women 
from rural areas whose circumstances have changed due to death of a spouse or divorce and who 
must relocate to find work to support dependent children, aged parents, or invalids (Kabeer and 
Tran 2000; GSO 2005).  Similar experiences can be observed in many other Asia-Pacific 
economies.  Thus, the aggregate growth success of most of the region’s economies conceals 
pockets of poverty within which little progress has been achieved. 
The departure of out-migrants has mixed effects at home.  Certainly, there is a loss of 
labor, often the most productive labor.  But offset against this is both a reduction in mouths to 
fed at home, which raises structural food security, and the flow of remittances (when it occurs), 
which provides an additional source of purchasing power and frequently helps insulate against 
unanticipated rural income shocks due to crop failures or agricultural price fluctuations.  
Migration also creates dynamic positive effects, as knowledge about other labor market 
opportunities flows back to the source population and enters the decision-making of future 
potential migrants (Phan and Coxhead 2007).  
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Opportunity-driven migration is clearly a more positive experience.  Booms in the growth 
of export-oriented, labor-intensive manufacturing jobs in China, Thailand, Vietnam, and 
Bangladesh have created direct benefits for relatively poor populations located far away in those 
same countries – either by raising the wage offered for their labor or by increasing effective 
employment rates, measured in terms of hours worked per month (Manning and Bhatnegar 2004; 
Phan and Coxhead 2007).  Under these circumstances, migration and economic growth are 
complementary, and both work to raise purchasing power and reduce income volatility for many 
poor people.  Migrants in foreign-invested factories in the Pearl River delta, in Ho Chi Minh 
City, in Dhaka, and in many other locations throughout Asia accumulate savings and send home 
remittances that help to spread the gains from globalization through a much wider community. 
However, even these relatively optimistic stories about the distribution of gains from 
globalization contain cautionary tales in which the very poorest households and communities are 
prevented from taking part in the general improvement of levels of living, frequently because 
their level of deprivation is such that they cannot afford to take the risky and costly step of 
sending family members out to participate in other labor markets.  This is very often because 
they lack access to capital markets, as borrowed capital is often needed for the ‘investment’ of 
migrating (Jalan and Ravallion 2002; Coxhead and Phan 2008).  In addition, government policies 
sometimes restrict internal migration, especially rural-to-urban migration.  This is famously the 
case in China, where the hukou residence certificate, which has the effect of discouraging 
internal labor movement, has been at its most effective in limiting the mobility of the poorest 
households.  By segmenting the labor market and preventing some would-be migrants from 
taking advantage of opportunities for urban-based employment, restrictions such as these act like 
a tax on rural earnings (Zhai and Hertel 2004). 
Clearly, there is no single, generally applicable conclusion about the links between labor 
incomes and food insecurity.  Distress-driven migration is symptomatic of poverty and 
deprivation, whereas opportunity-driven migration almost certainly contributes to its alleviation.  
Data on migration and remittances in Asia are incomplete, which impedes analysis.   
 
C.  Food prices 
The other side of the purchasing power ratio defined at the beginning of this section is the price 
of food sought by poor households.  Whereas higher wages and better labor productivity improve 
real income for food-deficit households, increases in food prices reduce it.  From the Green 
Revolution until the early years of this century, the real price of rice (as measured by the deflated 
Bangkok export price) declined substantially.  Between 1975 and 2002, it fell from about 
$US800/ton (in 2002 prices) to about $200/ton.  This represents, on average, a very substantial 
improvement in purchasing power for populations that spend between one-third and two-thirds 
of total earnings on basic food items.  During the same period, undernourishment (as a 
percentage of the population) fell in East Asia from 45 percent to 12 percent; in Southeast Asia 
from 39 percent to 12 percent; and in South Asia from 37 percent to 21 percent (see Chapter 2, 
Table 2.1).
9 
                                                 
9  Data for earlier years are available at http://www.fao.org/faostat/foodsecurity/index_en.htm.  
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Soon after the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the long decline in real food 
prices reversed.  Having fallen to $200/ton in 2002, the price of rice in world markets began to 
climb, nearly reaching $700/ton during the first half of 2008.  This and related food price trends, 
which have been dramatic enough to grab newspaper headlines and spur talk of a global “food 
crisis,” also exceed the gradual increases that many economists forecast could happen, depending 
on future changes in demand and supply. 
Some political figures have blamed recent price increases on speculators, even though no 
evidence has been provided that some person, group, or firm has been trying to “corner the 
market” (Young 2008).  Accusations of speculation would be worth considering if there were no 
other explanation for recent price increases.  But this is not the case – certainly not in the world’s 
largest economy.  The U.S. dollar has lost nearly half its value relative to the euro in recent 
years, falling from a peak of Є1.15 in 2001 and early 2002 to Є0.65 in early 2008.  In light of 
this devaluation, is it any wonder that more dollars must now be offered in exchange for any 
given amount of food? 
Another trigger for higher food prices has been the increase in oil prices.  For a very 
straightforward reason, the latter increase is a direct consequence of monetary devaluation in the 
United States.  International petroleum prices are always expressed in dollars and, as the U.S. 
currency has lost value, exporting countries have demanded more dollars for every barrel they 
supply.  Expensive energy has affected the food economy in various ways, generally driving up 
prices of edible products.  Certainly, production costs are sensitive to energy prices where 
agriculture is mechanized.  But these prices matter even in settings where tractors and other 
machinery are rarely used.  Chemical synthesis of nitrogen fertilizer, which has been a critical 
ingredient for yield growth, requires a lot of energy.  So does the transportation of inputs and 
output.  Even where crop production is un-mechanized, therefore, the cost of food rises and falls 
as the scarcity of energy varies. 
Another linkage between energy and agriculture has to do with the search for alternative 
energy sources, which gains strength when conventional fuels are costly.  Some of these 
alternative sources are agricultural, including the conversion of commodities such as sugar and 
corn into alcohol (or ethanol) as well as the production of biodiesel from palm oil.  The European 
Union has set a goal that biofuels comprise at least 5.75 percent of all transport fuel by 2010 
(Commission of the European Communities 2006).  In the United States, the conversion of corn 
into ethanol is encouraged with import restrictions and subsidies, which cost the U.S. Treasury 
$7 billion per annum (Doornbosch and Steenblik 2007, p. 6).  The effects of rising food and 
vegetable oil prices and the consequent conversion of agricultural lands on the world’s poor have 
attracted substantial attention, with a leading UN official describing the diversion of land to oil 
palm as a “crime against humanity” (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7065061.stm). 
Observing that “a moratorium on grain-based biofuels would quickly unlock these 
commodities for use as food,” Joachim von Braun (2008) contends that “this measure might 
bring corn prices down globally by about 20 percent.” also says that wheat prices would fall by 
10 percent if biofuel development ceased (von Braun 2008).  However, biofuel development is 
by no means the only cause of higher food prices.  Export restrictions also have had an impact.  
According to the World Bank (2008a), more than thirty nations, including several with the 
potential to be major suppliers in international commodity markets, adopted export restrictions in 
late 2007 and early 2008.  As a result of these restrictions, prices climbed even higher, to the 
detriment of food consumers everywhere.    
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  The recent global rise in food prices is the joint outcome of yield slowdowns, diversion of 
land and cereals to non-staple food uses, export restrictions, and other interventions.  Although 
hard data are not yet available, there is a wealth of informal evidence that rising food prices have 
pushed large numbers of Asia’s poor and near-poor into higher risk of food insecurity, offsetting 
the positive effects of rising employment and labor incomes even in the fastest-expanding 
economies.  For Asia’s food-insecure populations, a “perfect storm” of purchasing-power failure 
looms, if the current global slowdown destroys jobs just as other factors retarding food supply 
growth keeps food prices at or near their current high levels. 
 
D.  Development policy interventions 
Economic growth has indirect yet powerful influences on consumer welfare.  At the aggregate 
level, purchasing power never improves, and often deteriorates, in the absence of sustained 
economic growth.  Despite several decades of economic growth in most of Asia, some nations 
have not put in place the macroeconomic and other policies required for sustained economic 
expansion.  Others, such as the Philippines, have achieved nothing better than anemic per capita 
improvements, accompanied by persistent high levels of poverty. 
This is not the place to explore the reasons for aggregate growth failures in detail, 
although it is important to note a strong correlation between the degree of international economic 
integration and the potential for economic growth.  Countries that have pursued strongly inward-
oriented policies have experienced the least growth rates in per capita income, and now have the 
greatest levels of food insecurity and vulnerability to shocks.  North Korea and Myanmar are 
Asia’s most extreme examples of inward orientation, but low growth rates also have been 
recorded in other countries, such as the Philippines and India, during periods in which 
distortionary and persistent inward-orientation strategies have been pursued.  During these 
periods, these countries experienced not only lower growth overall, but also in most cases 
diminished resilience to global macroeconomic shocks such as those occurring after the 1970s 
oil price rises and during the global recession of 1979 to 1981. 
The Philippine economic collapse in 1984 to 1985 illustrates the dangers (Balisacan 
2003).  During a contraction of about 14 percent over the two years, poverty is estimated to have 
risen by at least 10 percent – a trend surely associated with a higher incidence of food insecurity 
through a loss of purchasing power on the part of the poor.  Similarly, Thailand’s adjustment 
during the same period (1981 to 1986) saw an increase in the number of poor people from 9.5 
million (20 percent of the population) to 13.6 million (26 percent of population), and an increase 
in the average income shortfall of the poor (the poverty gap) from 27 percent of the poverty line 
to 35 percent (World Bank 1990, Table 3.3).   
Explicit agricultural policy measures have also been highly influential in creating or 
lessening food insecurity.  In contemporary Asia, the two countries with the greatest risk of 
starvation, North Korea and Myanmar, are both characterized not only by brutal and highly 
corrupt dictatorships, but also in the economic sphere by pervasive and extreme levels of 
intervention in the operation of markets, and of state actions that undermine the institutional 
basis for domestic production and trade in goods, services, and labor. As with the food policies 
prevalent throughout Asia in an earlier era, some of these interventions are intended, 
paradoxically, to ensure food security for part of the population – the urban part – by holding 
down food prices or otherwise suppressing markets for edible goods.  Ironically, these sectoral  
    16 
policies, if maintained for a long period, can very easily create hardship and even starvation in 
food-producing areas by depriving farmers of inputs, incentives, and even the discretion to 
choose appropriate agricultural techniques and methods.  Myanmar is a tragic example of gross 
policy failure of this sort.  Formerly one of the world’s largest rice exporters, it is now one of the 
poorest countries in Asia and indeed the world, with high rankings on virtually all correlates of 
food insecurity.  North Korea, which professes a state ideology of “self-reliance” (juche), has 
paradoxically gained the distinction of becoming the world’s largest recipient of rice donations. 
Elsewhere among nations where food security has been addressed in part through trade 
policy, less extreme interventions have delivered less in terms of long-term food security than 
might have been hoped for.  The Philippines and Indonesia, which are the world’s two largest 
rice importing countries, have both tried (and failed) to meet food security goals with policy 
packages that strive both to restrict cereal imports and to stimulate increased domestic supply 
(Coxhead 2000).  More recently, China, which has its own history of failed interventions in 
domestic food production and trade, has taken actions that suggest a similar motivation.  In 2006, 
national authorities, who obviously were equating food security and self-sufficiency, decreed the 
preservation of 120m ha of farmland in an effort to preserve food security (The Economist 16 
October 2008).  However, the two concepts are not only fundamentally different, but may be 
unrelated.  Efforts to achieve the former are typically very costly, especially when the 
opportunity cost (of importing) is taken into consideration.  Interventions in support of food self-
sufficiency can undermine the operation of local markets, distort producer incentives, and 
increase susceptibility to domestic supply shocks when import responses are slow.  While food 
crises such as the price surge of 2007 and 2008 may occasionally justify unusual measures, the 
record of large food importers in Asia indicates that striving for self-sufficiency may actually 
undermine efforts to achieve food security in the long run.  
At the national level, transfers also matter.  Food aid, a transfer is specifically relevant to 
our subject, is important for some large food-deficit economies.  FAO data show that from 2000 
to 2004 Indonesia received an average of 131,000 tons of rice food aid per year,
10 the Philippines 
67,000 tons, Cambodia 26,000 tons, and North Korea a staggering 496,000 tons; the latter was 
equivalent to 71 percent and 47 percent of the Asian and world totals, respectively (International 
Rice Research Institute 2008).
11  Food aid is, of course, an after-the-fact attempt to alleviate 
existing food shortages and insecurity.  However, long-term development assistance and 
development policy include many other forms of transfer that are intended to raise the 
purchasing power of the poor.  Moreover, many transfers to food-insecure households do not 
take the form of food and do not necessarily emanate from government or international aid 
agencies.  During the 1980s Philippine economic crisis, the proportion of households whose 
primary income source was transfers or other unearned income rose from 6 percent (1971, the 
closest comparable figure) to 18.3 percent in 1985, which was “the year of shared poverty in 
post-war Philippine history” (Rao 1988). 
 
                                                 
10 This figure does not include aid flows after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004. 
11 Authors’ calculations from FAO data compiled by the International Rice Research Institute 
(http:irri.org/science/ricestat/data/may2008/WRS2008-Table15.pdf, accessed 4 November 2008).     
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4.  Incidence of food insecurity by gender and within households 
Great strides toward food security have been made in the world’s most populous continent, 
although progress has been far from uniform.  In East Asia and the Pacific, where two-fifths of 
the population were chronically or often hungry as recently as the early 1970s, the prevalence of 
food insecurity has fallen to approximately 10 percent.  In contrast, this prevalence is much 
higher in India and neighboring countries. 
  Many studies suggest that the South Asian difference has to do in part with the direct and 
indirect impacts of gender-related discrimination.  As Smith et al. (2003) report, “the extremely 
low status of women relative to men in South Asia compared with that in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
thought to compromise women’s own health, the subsequent birth weight of their children, and 
the quality of care their children receive.”  This inequality, which is said to be commonly 
observable in practices such as allowing a household’s males to eat before females, often causes 
women to go hungry.  The prevalence of such practices may help explain why five out of every 
six Indian women are anemic – as opposed to two our of every five women south of the Sahara, 
where average earnings, educational attainment, access to clean water, and other indicators of 
well-being are all inferior.   
IFPRI investigators Smith et al. (2003) find that the feminization of food insecurity has 
direct consequences for women’s offspring.  The birth weight of one-third of India’s newborns is 
abnormally low; in contrast, the corresponding figure in Africa is one-in-six.  Low birth-weight 
babies tend to have persistent health problems and their development is often impaired.  This is 
why the percentage of children who are malnourished in South Asia (50 percent of 5-year-olds) 
is higher than in any other part of the world, including Sub-Saharan Africa (33 percent of 5-year-
olds).  The capacity of malnourished children for physical labor later in life can be reduced, and 
even their intellectual development can be impaired.  Hence, childhood deprivation, which traces 
in part to gender inequality, ends up reducing the productivity of adult labor and therefore creates 
long-term structural food insecurity. 
The same investigators concede that cultural factors have much to do with the problem 
they have studied.  However, Smith et al. (2003) also argue for taking into account the gender 
dimension of food insecurity in programs for childhood nutrition, which attract considerable 
support.  For example, reducing iron deficiency among women would help to lower the 
incidence of severely underweight newborns.  This could be accomplished even if little were 
done (or, in the short run, little could be done) to change intra-household power imbalances 
between men and women, which Smith et al. (2003) document.  Studies from India, Bangladesh, 
and Pakistan, which have been summarized by Quisumbing et al. (1995), all demonstrate that the 
nutritional status of women and men can be improved by rebalancing the gender allocation of 
resources, opportunities, and decision-making power within the household.  A more recent study 
suggests that preference for sons in patrilineal systems systematically reduces nutritional status 
for girls because parents of girls will continue bearing children until the desired number of sons 
has been reached; therefore, girls will have larger numbers of siblings with whom they must 
share resources, other things equal (Jain 2008).  There is a need for more research to disentangle 
“cultural” from other causes of gender-based inequality in nutritional and food security status, in 
South Asia and possibly elsewhere.     
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5.  Summary and conclusions 
We have examined the food situation in Asia and the Pacific by distinguishing between structural 
insecurity, defined simply as local or domestic production being exceeded by local or domestic 
consumption, and market-related insecurity, which arises when a household, region, or country is 
unable because of market or policy failure to exchange its own output or resources for sufficient 
food. 
  Structural food insecurity changes over time because of various processes, some in the 
agricultural sector and others having to do with the entire economy or population or with the 
natural environment.  As we have documented, growth in food demand in Asia and the Pacific is 
no longer driven primarily by demographic expansion.  Instead, this growth is mainly a 
consequence of improved living standards, which have caused per-capita consumption of 
livestock products and other edible goods to increase. 
  Since the 1960s, food supplies in Asia and the Pacific have grown faster than demand.  
Moreover, increases in crop and livestock output have resulted mainly from agricultural 
intensification, during and since the Green Revolution, and not because of agriculture’s 
geographic expansion.  However, the pace of yield growth has been slackening, partly because of 
environmental constraints on agricultural intensification and partly because of lagging support 
for agricultural research and development. 
  Food insecurity is influenced by the operation or failure of markets.  Market-related food 
insecurity is complementary to structural insecurity in the sense that the former is a challenge for 
households, regions, or countries that cannot achieve structural food security – that is, are net 
buyers of food.  Markets, moreover, are influenced by explicit governmental actions, instruments 
such as trade and pricing policies, and the involvement of state instrumentalities in food 
production, storage, and distribution.  Used judiciously and in response to unexpected shocks, 
such as those that occurred in 2007 and 2008, these interventions may be effective at stabilizing 
food supplies and prices.  But experience in Asia, as in other parts of the world, suggests that the 
effectiveness of intervention declines as it becomes more pervasive and longer-lasting. 
  In this paper, we have examined various ways in which market-related food insecurity is 
alleviated or exacerbated.  An increase in the effective purchasing power of impoverished 
populations, whether resulting from an increase in earnings or transfers or from a decline in food 
prices, diminishes the incidence of food insecurity.  Similar results are obtained by augmenting 
the effective labor endowments of those same populations, for example through the provision of 
health and education services.  When economic opportunities in other settings draw migrants 
from impoverished areas, overall food insecurity improves.  However, no such result obtains if 
hunger and desperation cause people to relocate to places where their economic prospects stand 
little chance of improvement. 
  Food insecurity was once endemic in Asia and the Pacific, but is now confined largely to 
specific subpopulations whose characteristics and conditions combine both to make them 
structurally food insecure and to depress their terms of trade relative to the rest of the economy.  
In some cases, identification of vulnerable populations requires intra-household analysis, 
focusing for instance on the status of women.  In large measure, further progress toward food  
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security in Asia and the Pacific requires initiatives that target the needs of these populations.  
Development of agricultural technology well-suited to remote places where land quality is poor 
and where environmental risks are severe is a case in point.  Alleviating nutritional deficiencies 
for women, both for their sakes as well as for those of their offspring, is another. 
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Table 1  Growth in Population, Average Income, and Food Demand in Selected Asian and 




















Malaysia  1.66  3.97  -  - 
Thailand  0.61  4.12  0.65  3.29 
Philippines  1.87  5.34  0.66  5.39 
China  0.62  11.20  -  - 
Sri Lanka  0.30  6.47  0.70  4.83 
Indonesia  1.15  5.10  0.69  4.67 
India  1.21  7.72  -  - 
Vietnam  1.22  7.17  0.73  6.45 
Pakistan  2.11  4.16  0.72  5.11 
Mongolia  1.06  8.70  0.77  7.76 
Bangladesh  1.64  4.78  0.73  5.13 
Laos  1.73  5.25  -  - 
Cambodia  1.74  8.43  -  - 
Nepal  1.67  0.80  0.75  2.27 
 
* The formula for this calculation is:  Δ demand = Δ population + [elasticity x Δ income per capita], where Δ 
denotes percentage growth.  Missing from this definition is an interaction term, Δ population x [elasticity x Δ 
income per capita], which is of very small magnitude. 
 
Sources:  World Bank (2008) for population and income growth; 
ERS-USDA (2003) for income elasticities. 
  
    25 
Table 2  Rural Population Density, Fertilizer Use, Irrigation, and Cereal Yields 
in Selected Asian Nations, 1980 and 2000 
 
Country 
(ranked by average 
income) 
Rural Population 







1980             2000 
Irrigation 
(% of arable land) 
 




 1980            2000 
Malaysia  554    427               670     6.7                4.8   2,828           3,132 
Thailand  326      18               112   16.4              27.1  1,911           2,654 
Philippines  564      64               134   12.8              14.6  1,611           2,692 
China  561    149               256   45.1              36.3  3,027           4,845 
Sri Lanka  1,607    180               277   28.3              33.6  2,462           3,520 
Indonesia  591      65               124   16.2              14.4  2,837           4,141 
India  460      35               107   22.8              32.2  1,324           2,390 
Vietnam  923      30               341   25.6              37.6  2,049           4,375 
Pakistan  438      53               136   72.7              81.6  1,608           2,266 
Mongolia  87        8                   3     6.7                4.8     573              751 
Bangladesh  1,228      46               166   17.1              49.6  1,938           3,312 
Laos  495        4                 11   13.1              18.2  1,402           3,140 
Cambodia  274        5                   0     5.8                7.1  1.615           2,178 
Nepal  668      10                 26   22.5              36.2  2,521           3,453 
 
Source:  World Bank (2008).  
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Table 3  Trends in Arable Land, Crop Yields, and Output, 1970 to 2000 
 
East and Southeast Asia 
Crop  Production in 2000 
(million tons) 
Average Annual 








Rice  344  0.4  1.8  2.2 
Vegetables  313  4.4  1.5  6.0 
Roots and Tubers  239  0.1  1.2  1.3 
Corn  127  1.0  2.7  3.8 
Fruits  105  4.7  1.2  5.9 
Wheat  100  0.1  4.0  4.1 
Oil Crops  41  2.2  3.7  5.8 
Other Cereals  15  -3.5  1.4  -2.2 
 
South Asia 
       
Rice  184  0.5  2.0  2.5 
Wheat  98  1.4  2.8  4.3 
Vegetables  71  1.7  1.2  3.0 
Fruits  40  3.0  1.2  4.3 
Pulses  15  0.3  0.2  0.5 
Corn  14  0.4  1.0  1.6 
Millet  10  -1.7  0.7  -1.0 
Oil Crops  10  1.3  1.4  2.6 
Sorghum  10  -1.6  0.7  0.5 
 
Source:  Dixon and Gulliver with Gibbon (2001), pp. 182 and 228.  
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Figure 1  Area Planted to High-Yielding Varieties of Rice and Wheat 



















Source:  Dalrymple (1985), p. 1071. 
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Figure 2  Average Global Cereal Yield from 1961 through 2001 
 
Source:  Southgate, Graham, and Tweeten (2007), p. 58. 
 
 
 